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The Predictive Value of the National
Bureau's Leading Indicators
Frank E. Morris
SEVEN years ago, the National Bureau of Economic Research published
a monograph by Geoffrey Moore, entitled Statistical Indicators of Cyclical
Revivals and Recessions [reprinted here, Chapter 7]. This monograph
presented the results of the testing of more than 800 statistical series for
the stability of their relationship to the business cycle. From this group,
twenty-one indicators were selected as being particularly worthy of
attention. These twenty-one indicators were classified into three groups
according to their typical time sequence in the business cyle: a leading
group, a coinciding group, and a lagging group. The monograph suggested
that consensus measures of the movements of these groups of indicators
would be of value in analyzing cyclical trends in the economy.
The Objectives of This Paper
In this paper, I will attempt to appraise the predictive value of the
National Bureau's statistical indicators during the postwar years. This
is a rather appropriate time to undertake such an appraisal, since during
the first half of 1957 the trend indications given by the leading indicators
were quite at odds with prevailing opinion on the prospects for the
economy. In the course of making this appraisal, I will (1) note some
of the difficulties involved in applying these indicators to forecasting
on a current basis and (2) present a new type of consensus measure of the
indicators which appears to have some significant advantages over those
currently in use.
It is not an easy matter to make an objective evaluation of the use-
fulness of these indicators in forecasting during the postwar years because
the indicators do not, in themselves, constitute a complete basis for
forecasting, nor were they intended to do so. The indicators were chosen
because they bore a systematic relationship to the business cycle over long
periods and changed economic circumstances. They do not, however,
cover all of the important variables in the economy. At best, then, they
can provide only a partial analysis of business trends. The user must take
into consideration other information not reflected (or only partially
reflected) in the indicators and modify his conclusions accordingly. This
NOTE: Reprinted, with minor changes, from Proceedings of the Business and Economic
Statistics Section, American Statistical Association, September 11, 1957.
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being the case, in attempting to judge the effectiveness of this approach,
one has to consider, in addition to the behavior of the indicators, what
additional, modifying information the user should reasonably be expected
to have had—and opinions are certain to differ on this score.
It takes only a glance at a list of the twenty-one indicators to recognize
that they comprise some of the most important measures of economic
activity. So the question is not whether these indicators will be used by
forecasters, but how they should be used and how much emphasis should
be given to them.
The Validity of Ike Lead-Lag Classifications
In making this evaluation, it would seem that the first thing to establish
is whether the classification of these indicators into leading, coinciding,
and lagging groups, which was based on an analysis of prewar data, is
still appropriate in the light of the postwar experience. It might be noted
that, although this classification was made on empirical grounds, the
logical basis for the timing relationships of at least half of the indicators
is sufficiently strong that they would tend to be accepted even in the
absence of Moore's impressive empirical support. Few would dispute,
for example, that new orders for durable goods should tend to lead
changes in the level of output of durable goods, that construction contract
awards should tend to lead changes in the volume of construction work
and that a manufacturer should tend to adjust the hours worked by his
labor force before adjusting the size of his labor force. On the other hand,
the logical foundations for some of the relationships (for example, the
tendency of inverted business failure liabilities to lead the cycle)' are not as
strong; and their acceptance as indicators must rest to a greater extent
on empirical grounds.
Chart 4.1 shows the average duration of run of the leading, coinciding,
and lagging groups during the period from mid-1947 through mid-1957.
It should be noted that these are indexes which I have developed for my
own use and that they deviate somewhat from those of the National
Bureau. I have adapted the indicators to the needs of the investment
banking business by removing industrial stock prices and interest rates
(which are not very useful as indicators to investment bankers) from the
leading and lagging groups, respectively. I have also omitted the gross
national product and corporate profit series from the coinciding series,
because their availability only on a quarterly basis makes for difficulties
in combining these series with other series available on a monthly basis,
and because the quarterly data ordinarily are not available as promptly
as monthly data. For a reason to be mentioned at a later point, the measure
1See,however, V. Zarnowitz and L. Lerner, "Cyclical Changes in Business Failures
and Corporate Profits," Chapter 12.
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CHART4.1
Leading. Coinciding, and Lagging Series, Average Duration of Run,
1947—57
Months
of nonresidential construction contract awards which I use includes govern-
ment and public utility construction as well as commercial and industrial
construction. Despite these and other, more minor differences, the move-
ments of these indexes are basically very similar to those made by the
National Bureau, and any conclusions that may be drawn from the
behavior of these indexes are equally applicable to those of the National
Bureau.
Time does not permit an examination of the lead-lag performance of
the individual statistical series; so my remarks will have to be confined
to the performance of the groups of indicators. A study of Chart 4.1 would
seem to indicate that the lead-lag relationships which were found to exist
during the prewar years have continued to exist, despite the important
structural changes in the economy during the wartime and postwar
years. In the recessions and revivals of 1948—49 and 1953—54, the leading
series index crossed the zero average duration of run line a number of
months before the peak or trough was reached. In each instance, the
coinciding series index crossed the zero line within one or two months of
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the peak or trough. In the recessions of 1948—49 and 1953—54 the lagging
series index crossed the zero line only a number of months after the peaks
had been reached. The lagging group did not, however, lag in the revivals
from those recessions. This is probably attributable to the very mild
character of the postwar recessions.
In general, I think it is reasonable to say that the postwar experience
demonstrates that the time-sequence classification of these groups of
indicators has continuing validity. This finding, in itself; should increase
the value of these indicators to the forecaster and testify to the significance
of the classification work done by the National Bureau.
The Usefulness of the Indicators in Forecasting
Let us now attempt to appraise the usefulness of these indicators, and
in particular the leading series, in forecasting the course of economic
activity during the postwar years. It should facilitate this appraisal to
note first some of the difficulties encountered in using the indicators on
a current basis. The three principal difficulties are: (1) erratic swings
in the data, which cannot be entirely eliminated by smoothing devices;
(2) the variability of the lead time given by the leading series; and (3)
the fact that the leading series index is sensitive to leveling-off periods
and minor cyclical movements as wcIl as to major cyclical trends. These
difficulties are illustrated on Chart 4.2, which plots the leading series
index against the Federal Reserve industrial production index. In
addition, there are two lesser problems encountered in applying the
indicators currently, which will only be mentioned here: the lag in
obtaining the data and the problems caused by revisions of the data.
Success in using the leading series index in forecasting will depend,
to a considerable extent, on the ability of the user to distinguish between
brief; erratic movements in the data and movements which have funda-
mental cyclical significance. Perhaps it should be noted that this difficulty
is not restricted to this approach, but is inherent in any forecasting model
that uses current economic data. In retrospect it seems clear that the
leading series, which showed a declining trend from October 1947, gave
a rather clear indication of the coming recession of 1948—49. Nevertheless,
there was a four-month period, April through July 1948, when the index
moved counter to this trend. This erratic movement could, undoubtedly,
have been troublesome to the forecaster. Other similar situations could
be cited, but this is probably the most striking one.
The second difficulty is the variability of the lead time given by the
leading series. In the recessions and revivals of 1948—49 and 1953—54,
the lead time of the leading series index varied from eight to thirteen
months (measured from peak to peak and from trough to trough). The
lead time for revivals, during these cycles, was somewhat shorter than the
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CHART4.2
Federal Reserve Production Index and Average Duration
of Run of Leading Series, 1947—57
Index (1947-49=100) Months
lead time for recessions. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that
the length of the lead time in future cycles will remain within these
limits. Clearly, the behavior of the leading series index does not provide
a foundation for pinpointing in advance the precise timing of cyclical
turning points. Forecasters using these indicators would have to be
content with a much less precise type of forecasting.
Now to consider the third type of difficulty. Chart 4.2 shows that the
leading series index has had three complete cycles since mid-1947, but
that the economy has had only two. The cycle of the leading series
which started in the fourth quarter of 1947 and ran through the third
quarter of 1950 was reflected in the recession and revival of 1948—49.
The cycle of the leading series which started in the third quarter of 1952
and extended to the first quarter of 1955 was reflected in the recession
and revival of 1953—54. However, the cycle of the leading series which
ran from the third quarter of 1950 to the third quarter of 1952 was re-
flected not in a recession, but only in a leveling-off period extending from
early 1951 through mid-1952, which was followed by a sharp upturn in
output reaching a peak in mid-1953.
The "extra" cycle of the leading series during 1951—52 has been
pointed to by critics as demonstrating the fallibility of the entire approach.
There is no questioning the fact that the sensitivity of the leading series
to a leveling-off period in the economy places a burden on the user of the
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indicators of distinguishing between modest adjustment periods and
major cyclical movements. But this should not render the approach
unworkable. Some guidance in making this distinction may be given by
the performance of the coinciding and lagging series, a point that Geoffrey
Moore has stressed.2 In addition, the analyst must also use his knowledge
of the general economic environment.
I find it difficult to believe that any economist using these indicators
would have forecast a full-blown recession in 195 1—52. It is reasonable to
assume that he would have known about the Korean War, that he would
have known about the tremendous planned expansion in military
expenditures, and that he would have known about the government's
program to stimulate defense-related business investment. In view of the
presence of these powerful expansionary factors, it would seem unlikely
that he would have forecast more than a modest easing in the pace of
economic activity.
A modest easing in economic activity is, in fact, what resulted—a
reaction to the panic buying of both businesses and consumers which
occurred during the months immediately following the outbreak of the
Korean War. There was, as Chart 4.2 shows, a gentle downward trend
in industrial production during 1951 and the first half of 1952, and there
were movements of cyclical proportions in inventories, wholesale prices,
retail sales and other aspects of economic activity. But the swift expansion
in federal government expenditures offset their effects. Employment
showed a slight upward trend throughout the period, the impact on the
labor force being restricted to the number of hours worked.
The 195 1—52 period remains fresh in my memory, because during that
period I was an economist in the Office of Price Stabilization. After the
imposition of the general price freeze at the beginning of 1951, which
was followed by a frenzied period of organization, we found, somewhat to
our chagrin, that during the second half of 1951, apart from items directly
related to the defense effort, there was very little inflation to control
and, furthermore, that an astonishing percentage of basic commodities
and consumer goods were selling substantially below theirceiling
prices.
I think that the indicators would have been useful to us at OPS.
They showed that self-correcting forces were already at work at the time
of the imposition of the general price freeze. In retrospect, and somewhat
reluctantly, I would say that for the most part our efforts at OPS only
had the effect of formalizing, in a monumental mass of regulations, the
inflation that had already occurred.
Nevertheless, the fact that a sustained downward movement of the
leading series index will not always indicate a full-blown recession is,
2SeeChapters 3 and 7.
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obviously, a disadvantage; but it need not be a fatal one to the user who
is aware of this fact.
To sum up my impressions of the predictive value of the indicators
during the postwar years: I think that a competent analyst, using the
indicators, might have made some mistakes in attempting to forecast the
precise timing of cyclical turning points in the economy and he might
have made mistakes in judging, very far in advance, the amplitude of
swings in the economy. He should not, however, have made mistakes with
regard to the direction of movement of the economy; and, in general, I
think that his record in forecasting the recessions and revivals of 1948—49
and 1953—54 should have been reasonably good.
The Duration-Rate Index
At this point, I would like to digress and discuss the measures used
in obtaining a consensus of the movements of the groups of indicators.
The most commonly used measure is the "percentage expanding" index,
which simply records, in an unweighted fashion, the direction of movement
of the indicators. A second measure, less commonly used, is the "average
duration of run" index, which weights the direction of movement of the
indicators by the number of consecutive months that the movement has
occurred. This is the type of index used in Charts 4.1 and 4.2. The
advantage of the average duration of run is that it smoothes some of the
erratic movements found in the percentage expanding index and brings
Out the cyclical trend more clearly. Its disadvantages are that it occasion-
ally will lag behind the percentage expanding index at cyclical turning
points and that it is more difficult to explain.
These measures reflect the direction of change in the indicators, but
they do not reflect the rate of change. I thought it might be worth-while
to experiment with an index which gave some weight to the rate of
change in the indicators. The results of the experiment demonstrate that
this type of index has some considerable advantages over those now in
use.
One such index, which I call the "duration-rate" index, gives equal
weight to the duration of run and the rate of change in the indicators.
During the 1947—57 period, this index showed considerably less erratic
movement than either the percentage expanding or the average duration
of run. At the same time, it was as sensitive to cyclical turning points as
the percentage expanding index (and occasionally more sensitive).
The ability of the duration-rate index to bring out cyclical trends
more clearly without loss of sensitivity is based on the fact that a change
in the direction of movement of an indicator is often preceded by a slack-
ening in the rate of change of the indicator. The properties of the duration-
rate index and its construction are illustrated in Table 4.1, which shows
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TABLE 4.1
New Orders for Durable Goods
(seasonally adjusted)
%Change
3-Month % Change ±
Moving Durationin MovingMedian Duration
Period Average of Run Average %Change Rate
1948
May 7,063 +1 +3.1 1.8 +1.8
June 7,254 +2 +2.7 1.6 +3.2
July 7,677 +3 +5.8 3.4 +6.0
Aug. 7,705 +4 +0.4 0.2 +0.8
Sept. 7,750 +5 +0.6 0.4 +2.0
Oct. 7,651 —1 —1.3 0.8 —0.8
Nov. 7,468 —2 —2.4 1.4 —2.8
Dcc. 6,998 —3 —6.3 3.7 —6.0
1949
Jan. 6,707 —4 —4.2 2.5 —8.0
Feb. 6,445 —5 —3.9 2.3 —10.0
Mar. 6,418 —6 —0.4 0.2 —1.2
Apr. 6,315 —6 —1.6 0.9 —5.4
May 6,229 —6 —1.4 0.8 —4.8
June 6,192 —6 —0.6 0.4 —2.4
July 6,195 +1 +0.1 0.1 +0.1
Aug. 6,548 +2 +5.7 3.4 +4.0
Sept. 6,860 +3 +4.8 2.8 +6.0
Oct. 7,120 +4 +3.8 2.2 +8.0
the movements of the series on new orders for durable goods during
1948—49.
Since there are substantial differences in the cyclical amplitudes of
the indicators, some means had to be found to make the rates of change
in the various indicators reasonably comparable. To attain this com-
parability, the measure of the rate of change used in constructing the
index is the rate of change divided by the median rate of change for the
particular statistical series during the 1947—56 period. (For the new orders
for durable goods series in our example, the median rate of change in the
three-month moving average of the series was 1.7 per Cent.)
This rate of change measure is then multiplied by the duration of run
to obtain the duration rate, with the exception that, if the rate of change
is more than twice the median, it is considered to be only twice the median
in making the calculation. Thus, with the range of possible values of the
duration of run index limited to +6, the range of possible values for the
duration-rate index is ± 12.
Table 4.1 shows that the duration-rate figure for new orders for
durable goods reached a peak in July 1948, even though the direction of











figure reached a low point in February 1949, although the direction
of change remained downward through June.
To the extent that a slackening in the rate of change precedes a
reversal in the direction of movement of the indicators, which often
(but not always) occurs, the duration-rate index can be expected to lead
the duration of run index. If the user does not want to give weight to the
duration of run, a similar type index can be constructed which gives
equal weight to the direction of movement and the rate of change. This
index, which I call the "direction-rate" index, tends to coincide with (and,
occasionally, to lead) the percentage expanding index at important turning
points and, at the same time, shows considerably less erratic movement.
The smoothing quality imparted by weighting the indexes by the rate
of change in the indicators is demonstrated in Chart 4.3. Chart 4.3 shows
the percentage expanding, the average duration of run and the duration-
rate indexes from mid-1954 to the present. All three indexes are drawn
to the same scale. During this period, the movements of the percentage
















1954 1955 1956 1957SELECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF INDICATORS
comparable figures for the duration of run and duration-rate indexes
are 55 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively.3
Conclusions
In conclusion, the National Bureau's statistical indicators, like most
other tools of economic analysis, probably have considerably more merit
than their most uninformed critics see and probably more limitations than
some of their most ardent advocates like to recognize.
The difficulties in applying the indicators to forecasting on a current
basis, which I have noted, should demonstrate that these indicators do
not provide a certain and easy method of forecasting. They have not
brought automation to forecasting; and they do not threaten the pro-
fessional judgment of economists with technological unemployment.
However, I believe that the postwar experience does show that, properly
used, the indicators can be a very valuable tool for the forecaster.
There is, however, much room for the further development of this
approach. The recent work ofJulius Shiskin in breaking down the average
monthly fluctuations in the indicators into their irregular, cycle-trend, and
seasonal components provides a useful aid in analyzing the significance
of month-to-month changes in the data.4 There is need for a broadening
of the coverage of the leading indicators. In particular, I believe that the
leading series underweight the governmental sector of the economy. This
is the reason I have included government construction contract awards
in the nonresidential construction component of the leading series. This
is not to say that government construction itself tends to lead the cycle,
but that trends in government construction may dampen the impact of
a change in private construction; and, in fact, this has happened this year.
There is need for research toward establishing what Sidney Schoeffler
has called "validity conditions" for the indexes.5 And there is also need
for research toward establishing some linkages, capable of quantification,
between movements of the indicators and movements of the aggregates
to be forecast. With the infinite complexity of economic life,I am not
hopeful that such research will succeed in turning up a set of "rules of
thumb" having universal validity, but the attempt might provide an
improved basis for interpreting the movements of the indicators.
In summary, I am inclined to accept the judgment of Arthur F. Burns
when he said of the National Bureau indicators that they "should prove
extremely helpful to the many economists who can master statistical
devices without being mastered by them."6
For other experiments in which the indicators are adjusted according to their
average rate of change, see Chapters 18 and 19.
'See Chapter 17.
Sidney Schoeffler, The Failures of Economics: A Diagnostic Study, Cambridge, Mass.,
1955, pp. 56—64.
6Seep. 36.
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